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Twelve years have passed since we first took up
challenges to the broadcast ownership rules and diversity
initiatives of the Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”
or “Commission”). In some respects the Commission has made
progress in the intervening years. In key areas, however, it has
fallen short. These shortcomings are at the center of this
dispute—the third (and likely not the last) round in a protracted
battle over the future of the nation’s broadcast industry.
Specifically, the parties present challenges to the Commission’s
“eligible entity” definition, its Quadrennial Review process, and
its rule on television joint sales agreements.
Although courts owe deference to agencies, we also
recognize that, “[a]t some point, we must lean forward from the
bench to let an agency know, in no uncertain terms, that enough
is enough.” Public Citizen Health Research Group v. Chao, 314
F.3d 143, 158 (3d Cir. 2002) (emphasis and internal quotation
marks omitted). For the Commission’s stalled efforts to promote
diversity in the broadcast industry, that time has come. We
conclude that the FCC has unreasonably delayed action on its
definition of an “eligible entity”—a term it has attempted to use
as a lynchpin for initiatives to promote minority and female
broadcast ownership—and we remand with an order for it to act
promptly.
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Equally troubling is that nearly a decade has passed since
the Commission last completed a review of its broadcast
ownership rules. These rules lay the groundwork for how the
broadcast industry operates and have major implications for
television, radio, and newspaper organizations. Although federal
law commands the Commission to conduct a review of its rules
every four years, the 2006 cycle is the last one it has finished;
the 2010 and 2014 reviews remain open. Several broadcast
owners have petitioned us to wipe all the rules off the books in
response to this delay—creating, in effect, complete
deregulation in the industry. This is the administrative law
equivalent of burning down the house to roast the pig, and we
decline to order it. However, we note that this remedy, while
extreme, might be justified in the future if the Commission does
not act quickly to carry out its legislative mandate.
Whereas the first two issues before us involve agency
delay, the third is a challenge to agency action. The Commission
regulates the number of television stations a company can own.
In 2014, it determined that parties were evading its ownership
limits through the influence exerted by advertising contracts
known as joint sales agreements. As a result, it created a rule
designed to address this perceived problem. However, we
conclude that the Commission improperly enacted the rule;
hence we vacate it and remand the matter to the Commission.
I. Background
This is the third volume in a long-running saga that has
its roots in the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (1996). Section 202(h) of that law
imposes on the Commission what was initially a biennial—and
is now a quadrennial—obligation to examine its broadcast
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ownership rules. Broadly speaking, the purpose of these rules is
to limit consolidation in the industry by capping the amount of
common control that is permissible. Section 202(h) provides that
the Commission “shall” review its rules on broadcast ownership
every four years, “shall determine whether any of such rules are
necessary in the public interest as the result of competition,” and
“shall repeal or modify any regulation it determines to be no
longer in the public interest.” Id. § 202(h), 110 Stat. at 111–12,
as amended by Pub. L. No. 108-199, § 629, 118 Stat. 3, 99–100
(2004) (making review quadrennial as opposed to biennial).
Our first foray into § 202(h) came in 2004 when we ruled
on challenges to the Commission’s 2002 review of its ownership
rules. See Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC, 373 F.3d 372 (3d
Cir. 2004) (“Prometheus I”). Though § 202(h) is limited to a
review for whether ownership rules remain necessary in light of
competition in the broadcast industry, Prometheus I also
involved a challenge to the Commission’s efforts to promote
minority and female broadcast ownership.
Following our decision in Prometheus I, the Commission
set about fine-tuning its minority and female ownership
initiatives at the same time that it conducted its 2006
Quadrennial Review. In December 2007, it adopted two orders:
the first completing the 2006 review and the second
implementing diversity-related efforts. (Though adopted in late
2007, they were released in early 2008.) The former has become
known as the “2008 Order.” See 2006 Quadrennial Regulatory
Review—Review of the Commission’s Broadcast Ownership
Rules and Other Rules Adopted Pursuant to Section 202 of the
Telecommunications Act of 1996, Report and Order and Order
on Reconsideration, 23 F.C.C.R. 2010 (Dec. 18, 2007).
Meanwhile, the latter is called the “Diversity Order.” See
Promoting Diversification of Ownership in the Broadcasting
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Services, 2006 Quadrennial Regulatory Review—Review of the
Commission’s Broadcast Ownership Rules and Other Rules
Adopted Pursuant to Section 202 of the Telecommunications Act
of 1996, Report and Order and Third Further Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking, 23 F.C.C.R. 5922 (Dec. 18, 2007). In
2011, we decided challenges to both the 2008 Order and the
Diversity Order. See Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC, 652
F.3d 431 (3d Cir. 2011) (“Prometheus II”).
In Prometheus I and Prometheus II we reviewed
challenges to completed § 202(h) review cycles. But, in the
aftermath of Prometheus II, the process broke down. The 2010
Quadrennial Review, which was underway at the time of
Prometheus II, is still not complete. It was rolled into the 2014
review cycle, which remains ongoing. With its Quadrennial
Review process backed up and our remand instructions from
Prometheus II unfulfilled, the Commission issued a combined
order and notice of proposed rulemaking in 2014. See 2014
Quadrennial Regulatory Review—Review of the Commission’s
Broadcast Ownership Rules and Other Rules Adopted Pursuant
to Section 202 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Further
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking and Report and Order, 29
F.C.C.R. 4371 (Mar. 31, 2014) (“2014 FNPRM & Order”).
That brings us to the current dispute. In May 2014,
Prometheus filed in our Court a petition for review of the 2014
FNPRM & Order. Shortly afterward, Howard Stirk Holdings,
LLC; the National Association of Broadcasters; and Nexstar
Broadcasting, Inc. filed separate petitions for review in the D.C.
Circuit Court of Appeals. The FCC filed a notice of multi-circuit
petitions pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2112(a)(3), and the Judicial
Panel on Multidistrict Litigation randomly selected the D.C.
Circuit as the venue for the petitions. That Court consolidated
them, and the petitioners and various intervenors fully briefed
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the case. (Consistent with our past usage, we refer to petitioners
and intervenors raising anti-deregulatory challenges as “Citizen
Petitioners”1 and to groups seeking deregulation as
“Deregulatory Petitioners.”2)
Citizen Petitioners argued that the D.C. Circuit should
transfer the case to us because the petitions related, at least in
part, to Prometheus II. Our decision there ended in a remand,
and we retained jurisdiction over the remanded issues.
Prometheus II, 652 F.3d at 472. Deregulatory Petitioners
opposed transfer, maintaining that most of the issues in front of
the D.C. Circuit were independent of Prometheus II. By order
dated November 24, 2015, that Court transferred the
consolidated petitions to us, and we heard argument on April 19,
2016.3

1

Citizen Petitioners here are Prometheus Radio Project; Office
of Communication, Inc., of the United Church of Christ;
National Association of Broadcast Employees and Technicians–
Communications Workers of America; National Organization
for Women Foundation; Media Alliance; Media Council
Hawaii; Common Cause; Benton Foundation; and Multicultural
Media, Telecom and Internet Council.
2

Deregulatory Petitioners before us are Howard Stirk Holdings,
LLC; National Association of Broadcasters; Nexstar
Broadcasting, Inc.; and Mission Broadcasting, Inc.
3

In the D.C. Circuit, Howard Stirk was the lead petitioner. We
have re-captioned the case to make Prometheus the lead
petitioner for consistency with our previous two decisions.
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II. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review
These petitions present challenges to both agency delay
(the eligible entity definition and the failure to complete the
Quadrennial Review) and agency action (the joint sales
agreement rule). These two categories have different
jurisdictional hooks and standards of review.
A. Delayed agency action
Because circuit courts have exclusive jurisdiction over
the FCC’s final rulemaking action, see infra Section B, we also
have exclusive jurisdiction to review claims of agency inaction.
See Oil, Chemical & Atomic Workers Union v. Occupational
Safety & Health Admin., 145 F.3d 120, 123 (3d Cir. 1998)
(citing Telecommunications Research & Action Ctr. v. FCC, 750
F.2d 70, 75 (D.C. Cir. 1984)). This serves a commonsense
purpose: “Because the statutory obligation of a Court of Appeals
to review on the merits may be defeated by an agency that fails
to resolve disputes, a Circuit Court may resolve claims of
unreasonable delay in order to protect its future jurisdiction.”
Telecommunications Research & Action Ctr., 750 F.2d at 76.
Our standard of review comes from Administrative
Procedure Act (“APA”) § 706(1), which allows us to “compel
agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed.” 5
U.S.C. § 706(1). Under this provision, our “polestar is
reasonableness.” Public Citizen Health Research Group, 314
F.3d at 151. We must “balance the importance of the subject
matter being regulated with the regulating agency’s need to
discharge all of its statutory responsibilities under a reasonable
timetable.” Oil, Chemical & Atomic Workers Union, 145 F.3d at
123. We have held that,
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[w]ith this balance in mind, unreasonable delay
should be measured by the following factors:
First, the court should ascertain the length of time
that has elapsed since the agency came under a
duty to act. Second, the reasonableness of the
delay should be judged in the context of the
statute authorizing the agency’s action. Third, the
court should assess the consequences of the
agency’s delay. Fourth, the court should consider
any plea of administrative error, administrative
inconvenience, practical difficulty in carrying out
a legislative mandate, or need to prioritize in the
face of limited resources.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). We refer to these here as
the Oil, Chemical & Atomic Workers Union factors.
B. Final agency action
Circuit courts have exclusive jurisdiction over final FCC
rulemaking under 47 U.S.C. § 402(a) and 28 U.S.C. § 2342(1).
Per § 706(2) of the APA, we can set aside agency action that is
arbitrary or capricious. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2). “The scope of review
under the ‘arbitrary and capricious’ standard is narrow and a
court is not to substitute its judgment for that of the agency.”
Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto.
Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983). Despite this deference, we
require the agency to “examine the relevant data and articulate a
satisfactory explanation for its action[,] including a rational
connection between the facts found and the choice made.” Id.
(internal quotation marks omitted).
When the FCC conducts a Quadrennial Review under
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§ 202(h), that provision also affects our standard of review, as it
requires that “no matter what the Commission decides to do to
any particular rule—retain, repeal, or modify (whether to make
more or less stringent)—it must do so in the public interest and
support its decision with a reasoned analysis.” Prometheus I,
373 F.3d at 395. We have also concluded that, when § 202(h)
refers to rules being “necessary,” that term means “useful,”
“convenient,” or “helpful.” Id. at 394.
III. The Eligible Entity Definition
The FCC, in line with its statutory obligation to promote
minority and female broadcast ownership, has attempted to give
preferences to certain “eligible entities.” Citizen Petitioners
support the Commission’s objectives but argue that its definition
of eligible entities has not been helpful to minority and female
ownership. They contend that the Commission, in failing to
adopt a better definition, has violated our instructions from
Prometheus I and Prometheus II. They ask us to grant them
relief under APA § 706(1) or through a writ of mandamus. For
its part, the Commission says that it has tried to comply with our
previous two remands but that it lacks the administrative record
necessary to implement a different definition. However, this
conclusion is tentative, and the Commission has yet to determine
in a final order that it cannot do what Citizen Petitioners ask.4

4

Citizen Petitioners, in addition to requesting APA § 706(1) and
mandamus relief, also ask us to conclude that the Commission
has acted arbitrarily and capriciously. However, because they
contest agency delay rather than agency action, APA § 706(1)
and mandamus are the only available options. See, e.g., Oil,
Chemical & Atomic Workers Union, 145 F.3d at 123.
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A. The FCC’s objectives
The Commission has a statutory obligation to promote
minority and female broadcast ownership. For instance,
Congress has provided, in the context of applications for
licenses or construction permits, that a “significant preference
shall be granted to any applicant controlled by a member or
members of a minority group.” 47 U.S.C. § 309(i). And for
licenses and permits that the Commission awards using
competitive bidding, one of its objectives must be promoting
opportunities for “businesses owned by members of minority
groups and women.” Id. § 309(j).
As early as 1978, the FCC recognized that the inadequate
representation of minorities in the broadcast industry was
“detrimental not only to the minority audience but to all of the
viewing and listening public.” Statement of Policy on Minority
Ownership of Broadcasting Facilities, 68 F.C.C. 2d 979, 980–81
(May 25, 1978). Twelve years later, in Metro Broadcasting, Inc.
v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990), the Supreme Court upheld under
intermediate scrutiny two types of racial preferences designed to
remedy this problem. Id. at 566.5 Not long afterward, however,
the Supreme Court reversed course and held that “all racial
classifications, imposed by whatever federal, state, or local
governmental actor, must be analyzed by a reviewing court
under strict scrutiny.” Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña, 515

To pass intermediate scrutiny, preferences “must be
substantially related to an important governmental objective.”
Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988).
5
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U.S. 200, 227 (1995).6 Adarand did not affect gender
preferences, which received intermediate scrutiny prior to that
decision and have continued in its aftermath to be subject to that
standard. See, e.g., Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458
U.S. 718, 724 (1982); Tuan Anh Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 60
(2001).
Following Adarand, one of the Commission’s major
initiatives for fulfilling its statutory obligation has been to give
“eligible entities” certain preferences. This dates back to the
2002 § 202(h) review cycle. The Commission had established
new caps on radio station ownership but agreed to a
“grandfathering” provision that would allow companies that
already owned stations in excess of the limits to continue to do
so, with the caveat that they were not allowed to transfer the
grandfathered combinations. The FCC concluded during the
2002 cycle that, notwithstanding the prohibition, licensees could
transfer grandfathered combinations to eligible entities. See
2014 FNPRM & Order ¶ 264 (summarizing background). At the
time, the Commission said that an eligible entity was one that
qualifies as a small business under the revenue-based definition
used by the Small Business Administration (“SBA”). Id. Later,
the Commission expanded its use of the eligible entity definition
by applying it in other contexts. For instance, its rules have
aimed to give these entities financing preferences, provide them
with construction extensions, and generally encourage them to
own broadcast operations. See Prometheus II, 652 F.3d at 442
n.9.
The Commission, at least until recently, has defended its
Strict scrutiny requires a showing that preferences “are
narrowly tailored measures that further compelling
governmental interests.” Adarand, 515 U.S. at 227.
6
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revenue-based definition as a legally supportable means of
promoting minority and female ownership because the criteria
are race and gender neutral. However, the main criticism has
been that there is a lack of evidence showing that small
businesses are more likely to be owned by minorities or females.
See Prometheus II, 652 F.3d at 470. Several parties have
therefore asked the FCC to use a definition that gives
preferences to “socially and economically disadvantaged
businesses” (“SDBs”).
B. Prometheus I and its aftermath
In Prometheus I we remanded portions of the
Quadrennial Review proceedings to the FCC, but we rejected as
premature a challenge to the revenue-based eligible entity
definition. We credited the FCC’s contention that, “because of
pending legislation, the definition of SDBs is currently too
uncertain to be the basis of its regulation.” Prometheus I, 373
F.3d at 428 n.70. However, we noted our anticipation that “by
the next quadrennial review the Commission will have the
benefit of a stable definition of SDBs, as well as several years of
implementation experience, to help it reevaluate whether an
SDB-based [definition] will better promote the Commission’s
diversity objectives.” Id. Our anticipation turned out to be overly
optimistic, and to date the Commission still has not employed
any alternative definitions for eligible entities.
The next Quadrennial Review after Prometheus I was the
2006 cycle. In connection with this review, the Commission
released a notice of proposed rulemaking in the summer of
2006. This notice, however, sidestepped questions over how to
define SDBs. Commissioner Copps argued at the time that the
notice’s failure to address minority and female ownership
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violated our instructions from Prometheus I. See Prometheus II,
652 F.3d at 466 & n.33. The next year, the FCC issued another
notice of proposed rulemaking that acknowledged the failings of
the previous notice. It took note of two arguments that
supporters of an SDB-based definition raised against the first
notice: 1) that “the concept of SDBs is central to most . . .
minority ownership initiatives” and 2) that “without a definition
for SDBs, the Commission cannot effectively” comply with
Prometheus I. Id. at 467 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Notwithstanding these contentions, the second notice
“did not provide descriptions of any existing proposals for SDB
definitions . . . or discuss the Commission’s analysis of existing
briefing on those proposals’ constitutionality or efficacy.” Id.
Ultimately, the second notice did not do much with respect to
the eligible entity definition. It “merely called for general
comment on [the] proposal that the Commission define SDBs
for purposes of analyzing policy initiatives in support of media
ownership diversity.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
At the same time it overhauled a number of its rules in
the 2008 Order based on the 2006 Quadrennial Review, the
Commission issued the Diversity Order. That order, however,
did not consider proposed SDB-based definitions that had been
submitted to the Commission. Id. at 468. A large part of the
problem was inadequate data. An independent review concluded
that “all the researchers (and the peer reviewers) agree that the
FCC’s databases on minority and female ownership are
inaccurate and incomplete and their use for policy analysis
would be fraught with risk.” Id. (internal quotation marks
omitted). Two Commissioners dissented in part from the order.
Commissioner Copps specifically emphasized that the
Commission already should have started “getting an accurate
count of minority and female ownership.” Id. at 469 (internal
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quotation marks omitted). Ultimately, the order kept the
revenue-based eligible entity definition.
In connection with the Diversity Order, the FCC also
released another notice of proposed rulemaking that sought
comment on using the SBA’s definition of an SDB (as opposed
to the SBA’s revenue-based definition of a small business). Its
SDB definition uses both social and economic criteria. For the
former category, “[s]ocially disadvantaged individuals are those
who have been subjected to racial or ethnic prejudice or cultural
bias within American society because of their identities as
members of groups and without regard to their individual
qualities. The social disadvantage must stem from circumstances
beyond their control.” 13 C.F.R. § 124.103. Members of certain
groups, including African Americans, Hispanic Americans, and
Native Americans, get a rebuttable presumption that they
qualify. Id. Meanwhile, the economic definition encompasses
“socially disadvantaged individuals [as defined above] whose
ability to compete in the free enterprise system has been
impaired due to diminished capital and credit opportunities as
compared to others in the same or similar line of business who
are not socially disadvantaged.” Id. § 124.104.
Two years later, in 2010, the Commission’s own group of
experts, the Advisory Committee on Diversity for
Communications in the Digital Age, proposed another possible
eligible entity definition. It would give a preference “for
individuals who have faced substantial disadvantages and
overcome those disadvantages.” See Joint Appendix 984. This is
known as the overcoming disadvantages preference (“ODP”).
As examples of potential disadvantages, the Committee
mentioned: 1) physical disabilities or psychological disorders; 2)
physical or emotional trauma due to military service; 3) unequal
access to higher education; 4) unequal access to credit; 5)
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unequal treatment in hiring or promotions; 6) exclusion without
cause from business, professional, or social associations; 7)
retaliatory or discriminatory behavior by an employer or school;
and 8) social patterns or pressures. Id. at 987. The Committee
concluded that the proposal would not trigger heightened
scrutiny because “the program would not award preferences on
the basis of an applicant’s ethnicity or gender.” Id. at 993. As a
result, it predicted that courts would apply rational basis review.
Id.7
C. Prometheus II
Although the Commission sought comments on using the
SBA’s social and economic criteria and the Advisory Committee
on Diversity for Communications in the Digital Age separately
proposed a definition based on having overcome disadvantages,
the revenue-based definition was still the one in place (and the
only one the FCC had formally considered) by the time we
decided Prometheus II. In that decision we found the revenuebased definition to be arbitrary and capricious and remanded the
matter to the Commission. Prometheus II, 652 F.3d at 469–71.
This put a freeze on all ongoing initiatives that relied on an
eligible entity definition. We concluded that, “[f]irst and
foremost, the Diversity Order does not explain how the eligible
entity definition adopted would increase broadcast ownership by
Under rational basis review, “a classification . . . comes to us
bearing a strong presumption of validity, and those attacking
[its] rationality . . . have the burden to negat[e] every
conceivable basis which might support it.” FCC v. Beach
Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 314–15 (1993) (internal
citations and quotation marks omitted).
7
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minorities and women.” Id. at 470. We also said that
it is hard to understand how measures using this
definition would achieve the stated goal. For
example, by the Commission’s own calculations,
minorities comprise 8.5% of commercial radio
station owners that qualify as small businesses
[under the revenue-based definition], but 7.78%
of the commercial radio industry as a whole—a
difference of less than 1%. Thus, these measures
cannot be expected to have much effect on
minority ownership.
Id. (internal citation omitted). We noted also that “the
Commission referenced no data on television ownership by
minorities or women and no data regarding commercial radio
ownership by women. This is because, as the Commission has
since conceded, it has no accurate data to cite.” Id. (emphases in
original).
At the time of Prometheus II, an FCC initiative to fix the
data problem was underway. Specifically, in the spring of 2009
the Commission issued another notice of proposed rulemaking
along with a report and order that instituted certain changes. The
principal efforts related to Form 323, which the FCC uses to
track race, ethnic origin, and gender data for broadcast licensees.
Prior to 2009, full-power commercial AM, FM, and television
broadcast stations typically had to file Form 323 biennially, but
many other types of entities were exempt. The 2009 initiative
ended the exemption for sole proprietorships, partnerships
comprised of natural persons, and low-power television stations.
See Promoting Diversification of Ownership in the Broadcasting
Services, 2006 Quadrennial Regulatory Review—Review of the
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Commission’s Broadcast Ownership Rules and Other Rules
Adopted Pursuant to Section 202 of the Telecommunications Act
of 1996, Report and Order and Fourth Further Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking, 24 F.C.C.R. 5896, ¶ 3 (Apr. 8, 2009).
The FCC also directed that the format for filing Form 323 be
changed so that a searchable database could be created. Id. ¶ 20.
The Commission expressed optimism that these changes,
along with others outlined in the document, would fix the data
gap. Id. ¶ 12 (“We believe that the changes we are adopting
today adequately address [the] criticisms and will allow us to
undertake studies that reliably analyze minority and female
ownership.”). Our reaction to these efforts in Prometheus II was
that, while “this is certainly a welcome and long overdue step, it
does not remedy the existing data gap in the Diversity Order.”
Prometheus II, 652 F.3d at 471.
After finding the eligible entity definition to be arbitrary
and capricious in Prometheus II, we noted our expectations for
how the FCC should proceed on remand. First, we
“anticipate[d]” that the Form 323 changes would “lay necessary
groundwork for the Commission’s actions.” Id. Next, we
directed the Commission to consider proposed eligible entity
definitions before completing the 2010 Quadrennial Review. Id.
(“We conclude . . . that the FCC did not provide a sufficiently
reasoned basis for deferring consideration of the proposed SDB
definitions and remand for it to do so before it completes its
2010 Quadrennial Review.”); see also id. at 472 (“[W]e reemphasize that the actions required on remand should be
completed within the course of the Commission’s 2010
Quadrennial Review of its media ownership rules.”).
Consideration of the proposals was particularly urgent because,
“[d]espite our prior remand requiring the Commission to
consider the effect of its rules on minority and female
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ownership, and anticipating a workable SDB definition well
before this rulemaking was completed, the Commission has in
large part punted yet again on this important issue.” Id. at 471.
We cautioned that the FCC could not merely fall back on
Adarand to justify further delays: “Stating that the task is
difficult in light of Adarand does not constitute ‘considering’
proposals using an SDB definition.” Id. at 471 n.42. We also
addressed the data gap, concluding that the “FCC’s own failure
to collect or analyze data, and lay other necessary groundwork,
may help to explain, but does not excuse, its failure to consider
the proposals presented over many years. If the Commission
requires more and better data to complete the necessary Adarand
studies, it must get the data and conduct up-to-date studies . . . .”
Id. Despite these concerns, we were nonetheless “encouraged
that the FCC has taken steps” to plug the data gap, and we
anticipated that it would “act with diligence to synthesize and
release existing data such that studies will be available for
public review in time for the completion of the 2010
Quadrennial Review.” Id.
D. Aftermath of Prometheus II
In December 2011 (five months after Prometheus II), as
part of its report on the still ongoing 2010 Quadrennial Review,
the Commission once again punted, citing data concerns. It
wrote:
We recognize that the data currently in the record
of this proceeding are not complete and are likely
insufficient either to address the concerns raised
in Prometheus II or to support race- or genderbased actions by the Commission. Although we
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would prefer to be able to propose specific actions
in response to the Third Circuit’s remand of the
measures relying on the eligible entity
definition . . ., we believe that making legally
sound proposals would not be possible based on
the record before us at this time.
2010 Quadrennial Regulatory Review—Review of the
Commission’s Broadcast Ownership Rules and Other Rules
Adopted Pursuant to Section 202 of the Telecommunications Act
of 1996, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 26 F.C.C.R. 17489,
¶ 158 (Dec. 22, 2011). It then committed to undertaking the
following initiatives in anticipation of the 2014 Quadrennial
Review:
1) Continue to improve our data collection so that
we and the public may more easily identify the
diverse range of broadcast owners, including
women and minorities, in all services we license;
2) Commission appropriately-tailored research and
analysis on diversity of ownership; and 3) Conduct
workshops on the opportunities and challenges
facing diverse populations in broadcast ownership.
In addition, we ask interested parties to supplement
the record and provide any and all data available
that can complete a picture of the current state of
ownership diversity, including minority and female
ownership in the broadcast industry[,] and to
justify any prospective actions the Commission
may take on remand.
Id.
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Also in anticipation of the 2014 review, the Commission
sought comments about whether it should keep the revenuebased eligible entity definition. Specifically, it asked whether
there was any “additional evidence available that would show a
stronger connection” between using that definition and
promoting minority and female ownership. Id. ¶ 160. It also
asked whether “other policy objectives aside from the promotion
of minority and female station ownership,” such as encouraging
ownership by small businesses, might support using a revenuebased definition. Id. ¶ 161. With respect to alternative
definitions of eligible entities, the FCC once again sought
comment on whether to use the SBA’s social and economic
preferences. Id. ¶ 163. It also asked about any other definitions
that commenters might suggest. Id.
The next year, the Commission released a document
known as the 2012 323 Report, which provides analysis of the
first two rounds of reporting under the revised biennial Form
323 requirements. It concluded that the new approach was
working: “These data represent the first two snapshots of
broadcast ownership in a series of planned biennial data
collections that, taken together, should provide a reliable basis
for analyzing ownership trends in the industry, including
ownership by racial and ethnic minorities and women.” 2012
323 Report, 27 F.C.C.R. 13814, ¶ 2 (Nov. 14, 2012). The results
confirmed the underrepresentation of minorities and women. For
instance, as of the 2011 Form 323 reporting period, racial
minorities had majority ownership of just 2.2 percent of fullpower commercial television stations. Id. ¶ 7. For women, that
number was 6.8 percent. Id. ¶ 5.
Finally, in the 2014 FNPRM & Order, the FCC addressed
our Prometheus II remand, saying: “As directed by the court, we
consider the socially and economically disadvantaged business
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definition as a possible basis for favorable regulatory treatment,
as well as other possible definitions that would expressly
recognize the race and ethnicity of applicants.” 2014 FNPRM &
Order ¶ 7. However, it tentatively rejected them. And although
it “concede[d] that we do not have an evidentiary record
demonstrating that this standard specifically increases minority
and female broadcast ownership,” the Commission tentatively
recommended reinstating the revenue-based standard that we
had rejected in Prometheus II as arbitrary and capricious. Id.
¶ 267. It reasoned that, “even in the absence of such evidence,
we believe that reinstatement of the revenue-based standard
would serve the public interest by promoting small-business
participation in the broadcast industry.” Id.
In evaluating SDB-based—as opposed to revenuebased—proposals, the Commission never considered whether
they would increase minority and female ownership. Rather, it
rejected them on the ground that they would not, on the current
record, survive constitutional scrutiny. First, the Commission
considered whether it could establish a compelling
governmental interest, as required to pass strict scrutiny. It
concluded that its “interest in promoting a diversity of
viewpoints could be deemed sufficiently compelling to survive
strict scrutiny analysis.” Id. ¶ 286. However, it determined that
there was not enough record evidence to meet strict scrutiny’s
narrow tailoring requirement. Id. ¶ 282.
In support of that conclusion, the Commission walked
through the studies in the administrative record. It determined
that two “directly address the impact of minority ownership on
viewpoint diversity.” Id. ¶ 292. The first, Media Ownership
Study 8A, found that “the relationship between minority
ownership and viewpoint diversity is not statistically
distinguishable from zero.” Id. The second, Media Ownership
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Study 8B, found “almost no statistically significant relationship
between [minority] ownership and . . . viewpoint diversity.” Id.
¶ 293. The exception in 8B was a positive correlation between
minority ownership and coverage of minority politicians. Id.
The Commission also looked at studies that found a
connection between minority ownership and diversity of
programming or format. For instance, Media Ownership Study 7
showed that the “presence of minority-owned stations increases
the amount of minority-targeted programming and that the
availability of minority-targeted formats attracts more minorities
to listening.” Id. ¶ 294. Another study determined that “72.5
percent . . . of minority-owned radio stations broadcast minorityoriented formats, including Spanish, Urban, Urban News, Asian,
Ethnic and Religious formats geared to minority audiences.” Id.
¶ 296. However, the FCC concluded that these studies were not
helpful because, though they tie minority ownership to diversity,
they do not relate to viewpoint diversity. Id. ¶ 294 (“We do not
believe that evidence regarding program or other forms of
diversity is as relevant as evidence regarding viewpoint diversity
for the purpose of establishing narrow tailoring to a compelling
interest.”). The Commission based this determination on its
reading of Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S.
622 (1994), which it said stands for the principle that viewpoint
diversity in broadcasting is an interest “of the highest order.”
2014 FNPRM & Order ¶ 294 & n.888 (internal quotation marks
omitted).
Based on this review, the FCC concluded that the studies
“begin to answer” some of the questions necessary for a strict
scrutiny analysis but “do not demonstrate the nearly complete or
tightly bound nexus between diversity of viewpoint and minority
ownership that would be required to justify a race-based eligible
entity definition.” Id. ¶ 298 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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The Commission also tentatively determined that the record did
not “reveal a feasible means of carrying out the type of
individualized consideration the Supreme Court has held is
required to pass constitutional muster under strict scrutiny.” Id.
¶ 299. It noted that, although the Supreme Court has approved
the use of racial preferences in higher education, the “manner in
which the Commission allocates broadcast licenses is different
in many important respects from university admissions, and we
believe that implementing a program for awarding or affording
preferences related to broadcast licenses based on the
‘individualized review’ required in other contexts would pose a
number of administrative and practical challenges for the
Commission.” Id.
The Commission also gave limited attention to the
proposed ODP (overcoming disadvantages preference) standard.
At the outset, it said that “it is not entirely clear whether the . . .
standard would be subject to heightened constitutional scrutiny.”
Id. ¶ 300. This is so even if the standard would not mention race
or gender and would instead focus on disadvantages that anyone
could face. The Commission reasoned that a standard that does
not “facially include race-conscious criteria, yet is constructed
for the purpose of promoting minority ownership, might be
subject to heightened scrutiny.” Id. ¶ 300 n.915. It also noted:
Among other issues, no commenter provided
input on (1) what social or economic
disadvantages should be cognizable under an
ODP standard,8 (2) how the Commission could
validate claims of eligibility for ODP status, (3)
The Commission’s apparent lack of awareness of the types of
cognizable disadvantages is surprising. As discussed, its own
advisory group supplied a list of proposed types in 2010.
8
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whether applicants should bear the burden of
proving specifically that they would contribute to
diversity as a result of having overcome certain
disadvantages, (4) how the Commission could
measure the overcoming of a disadvantage if an
applicant is a widely held corporation rather than
an entity with a single majority shareholder or a
small number of control persons, and (5) how the
Commission could evaluate the effectiveness of
the use of an ODP standard.
Id. ¶ 300.
Next, the Commission considered the possibility of
preferences that focused on gender alone, as these would trigger
intermediate rather than strict scrutiny. It concluded:
While we acknowledge that the data show that
women-owned stations are not represented in
proportion to the presence of women in the
overall population, we do not believe that the
evidence available at this time reveals that the
content provided via women-owned broadcast
stations substantially contributes to viewpoint
diversity in a manner different from other stations
or otherwise varies significantly from that
provided by other stations.
Id. ¶ 301.
Finally, the FCC rejected the notion that its approach
violated our remand in Prometheus II. The crux of its argument
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is that we said it needed to consider adopting an SDB-based
definition in connection with the 2010 Quadrennial Review,
which technically has not ended yet because it was rolled into
the 2014 cycle (which, in turn, is not yet complete). As it
explained:
The Commission intends to follow the Third
Circuit’s direction that we consider adopting an
SDB definition before completion of this
proceeding and evaluate the feasibility of
adopting a race-conscious eligibility standard
based on an extensive analysis of the available
evidence. We do not believe that the Third Circuit
intended to prejudge the outcome of our analysis
of the evidence or the feasibility of implementing
a race-conscious standard that would be
consistent both with applicable legal standards
and the Commission’s practices and procedures.
Id. ¶ 283.
E. Discussion
With 12 years having passed since Prometheus I, we
conclude that the Commission has had more than enough time to
reach a decision on the eligible entity definition. We put it on
notice of our concerns five years ago in Prometheus II. 652 F.3d
at 471. We directed it to take action in the course of the 2010
Quadrennial Review, id., and then we returned to that topic
again to “re-emphasize” our directive, id. at 472. However, the
Commission has not complied.
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In light of this history, the Oil, Chemical & Atomic
Workers Union factors for evaluating requests under APA
§ 706(1) all counsel in favor of finding an unreasonable delay.
First, we must consider “the length of time that has elapsed
since the agency came under a duty to act.” Oil, Chemical &
Atomic Workers Union, 145 F.3d at 123. Here the duty to act
arose as early as 2004 as a result of our Prometheus I decision
and became even more explicit in Prometheus II. Second, we
must judge “the reasonableness of the delay . . . in the context of
the statute authorizing the agency’s action.” Id. Federal law
imposes on the Commission an obligation to promote ownership
by minorities and women. See 47 U.S.C. §§ 309(i), (j). As such,
we have described promoting minority and female ownership as
an “important aspect of the overall media ownership regulatory
framework.” Prometheus II, 652 F.3d at 472. Third, we need to
“assess the consequences of the agency’s delay.” Oil, Chemical
& Atomic Workers Union, 145 F.3d at 123. In our case, the
consequence is that several initiatives pegged to a workable
eligible entity definition cannot take effect. Finally, we have to
look at “any plea of administrative error, administrative
inconvenience, practical difficulty in carrying out a legislative
mandate, or need to prioritize in the face of limited resources.”
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). We already have
determined that difficulty in collecting data does not justify the
delay here. See Prometheus II, 652 F.3d at 471 n.42.
In another context, we have ordered action under APA
§ 706(1) when an agency had delayed for nine years. See Public
Citizen Health Research Group, 314 F.3d at 153 (“We find
extreme OSHA’s nine-year (and counting) delay since
announcing its intention to begin the rulemaking process, even
relative to delays other courts have condemned in comparable
cases.”). Here more than a decade has passed since Prometheus
I. Although “we are sympathetic to [the] claim that a
thorough . . . analysis is both highly important and quite
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difficult, we cannot allow an imperfect analysis to justify
indefinite delay.” Id. at 156.
The FCC presents two arguments for why we should not
order relief. Both fail. The first is that it is not yet in violation of
Prometheus II because we instructed it to address the eligible
entity definition during the 2010 Quadrennial Review, which is
still ongoing. This contention improperly attempts to use one
delay (the Quadrennial Review) to excuse another (the eligible
entity definition). By this logic, the Commission could delay
another decade or more without running afoul of our remand.
Simply put, it cannot evade our remand merely by keeping the
2010 review open indefinitely.
The second reason is that the FCC’s Chairman has
committed to circulating to the other Commissioners by June 30
of this year an order taking final action on the eligible entity
definition. Counsel for the Commission said at oral argument
that it was reasonable to expect that the order would be finalized
and adopted by the end of year. See Oral Arg. Tr. at 46. The
D.C. Circuit encountered a similar request from the FCC for
forbearance in In re Core Communications, Inc., 531 F.3d 849
(D.C. Cir. 2008). There, as the Court was considering whether to
mandate action after the Commission had violated a remand
order, counsel said that ordering relief was not necessary
because “the Commission [was] on the brink of concluding” its
obligations. Id. at 858. The Court rejected the request to stay its
hand, observing that “[w]e have heard this refrain before.” Id.
So have we. The Commission justified delay in Prometheus I on
the basis of pending legislation. In Prometheus II it did the same
based on data concerns but said that better data was forthcoming
due to the Form 323 revisions.
Moreover, although we appreciate the Chairman’s
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commitment to prompt action, it is not reason enough to refrain
from issuing an order, particularly because his desire to move
quickly does not bind his fellow Commissioners. As the D.C.
Circuit aptly explained,
the Chairman’s doing “everything he can” may
not suffice, as he may not be able to enforce his
will on his fellow Commissioners. In any event,
the representation is not enforceable unless
backed up by issuance of [an order]. At some
point, promises are no longer enough, and we
must end the game of administrative keep-away.
Id. at 859 (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, although we
expect that the Commission will meet the proposed deadline, in
light of the previous delays we find it necessary to back up that
expectation with an order.
We therefore remand and order the Commission,
pursuant to APA § 706(1), to act promptly to bring the eligible
entity definition to a close.9 It must make a final determination
as to whether to adopt a new definition. If it needs more data to
do so, it must get it. We do not intend to prejudge the outcome
of this analysis; we only order that it must be completed. Once
the agency issues a final order either adopting an SDB- or ODPbased definition (or something similar) or concluding that it
cannot do so, any aggrieved parties will be able to seek judicial
review.
9

Because a writ of mandamus would not provide anything other
than what we are granting under the APA, we need not rule on
Citizen Petitioners’ separate request for that form of relief.

33

Though we readily conclude that the time for prompt
action has arrived, the harder issue is determining what
“prompt” should mean. Recognizing that the parties are in a
better position than us to understand the complexities of what is
required, we proposed at oral argument the possibility of
following our approach in Public Citizen Health Research
Group, where we turned to mediation after ordering APA
§ 706(1) relief. The parties agreed to this approach, and as a
result we order mediation between Citizen Petitioners and the
Commission for purposes of fixing a timetable for final agency
action.10 However, we include here the same caveat that we did
in Public Citizen Health Research Group: If the parties are not
able to agree within 60 days on an appropriate timeline, we will
promulgate a schedule that we deem appropriate. See 314 F.3d
at 159.11

10

Apart from setting a schedule, we also encourage the parties
to discuss the substance of the eligible entity proposals, as well
as other ways, outside of the eligible entity context, for the
Commission to fulfill its statutory obligation to foster diversity.
11

Multicultural Media, Telecom and Internet Council
(“MMTC”), an intervenor, raises an argument that relates in
many ways to the eligible entity discussion. Specifically, MMTC
contends that the Commission acted arbitrarily and capriciously
in declining to address 24 diversity-related proposals that were
suggested by a coalition of national organizations. Several of
these proposals would benefit from a revised eligible entity
definition. The Commission noted that the proposals “are
accompanied by detailed and thoughtful analysis” and that
“some of them may warrant further consideration.” 2014
FNPRM & Order ¶ 317. However, it tentatively determined that
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IV. Failure to Complete Quadrennial Review
Section 202(h) of the Telecommunications Act of 1996
uses unmistakably mandatory language in describing the
Commission’s obligations. It provides that the Commission
“shall” review its rules on broadcast ownership every four years,
“shall determine whether any of such rules are necessary in the
public interest as the result of competition,” and “shall repeal or
modify any regulation it determines to be no longer in the public
interest.” This repeated use of “shall” creates “an obligation
impervious to . . . discretion.” Lexecon Inc. v. Milberg Weiss
it would not address them during the 2014 review because “they
are outside the scope of this proceeding.” Id. The FCC based
this conclusion on its representation that the proposals “involve
cable operators and other non-broadcast services that are outside
the scope of our quadrennial review proceedings” and/or
“ultimately would require legislative action or action by other
federal entities aside from the Commission in order to create
changes in rules or policies.” Id. In supplemental briefing
MMTC identified a substantial number of proposals to which it
says neither reason applies.
The Commission responds that MMTC’s challenge is
premature because the decision not to consider the proposals
was tentative rather than final. It also represents that it will deal
with them in the document that the Chairman has committed to
circulating by June 30, 2016. Because MMTC only seeks here to
void agency action it considers to be arbitrary and capricious
and does not raise a claim of undue delay, we set aside its
challenge as premature but note our expectation that the
Commission will meet its proffered deadline.

35

Bershad Hynes & Lerach, 523 U.S. 26, 35 (1998). Indeed, the
very purpose of § 202(h)—to function as an “ongoing
mechanism to ensure that the Commission’s regulatory
framework would keep pace with the competitive changes in the
marketplace,” Prometheus I, 373 F.3d at 391 (internal quotation
marks omitted)—reinforces the need for timeliness.
Despite this command from Congress, the last review that
the Commission completed was, as noted, the 2006 cycle. The
order ending that review was adopted in December 2007 and
released in February 2008, and it led to Prometheus II. Since
2008, more than eight years—enough time for two review
cycles—have passed without any final action. In 2014, the
Commission said it was “cognizant” of its “statutory obligation
to review the broadcast ownership rules every four years,” but it
concluded, based on deficiencies in the record, that it was
unable to wrap up the 2010 review. 2014 FNPRM & Order ¶ 1.
As a result, it rolled that review into the 2014 cycle, which is
still ongoing.
Asked repeatedly at oral argument to explain the reason
for the delay, the Commission was unable to provide a cogent
response. And we note that at least one Commissioner shares
our confusion. See Statement of Commissioner Ajit Pai,
Dissenting, 29 F.C.C.R. 4371, 4587 (Mar. 31, 2014) (“Pai
Dissent”) (“Our decision today—or, to be more accurate, our
lack of decision—is a thumb in the eye of Congress and an
evasion of our legal obligations. What makes it even worse is
that [the 2014 FNPRM & Order] contains no meaningful
explanation for why we are not resolving the quadrennial
review.”).
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A. The costs of delay
The Commission’s delay keeps five broadcast ownership
rules in limbo: the local television ownership rule, the local
radio ownership rule, the newspaper/broadcast cross-ownership
(“NBCO”) rule, the radio/television cross-ownership rule, and
the dual network rule.12 We provided an overview of these rules
in our 2011 decision. See Prometheus II, 652 F.3d at 438–42.
Because the challenge here is not to the content of the rules, but
rather relates to the consequence of the Commission’s delay, we
need not repeat that summary here.
Though a full exploration of the rules is not necessary, a
brief discussion of one of them, the NBCO rule, provides a
telling example of why the delay is so problematic. The rule,
which dates back to 1975, prohibits common ownership of a
daily newspaper and a television or radio station in the same
market. See 47 C.F.R. § 73.3555(d). As part of its 2002 review,
the FCC determined that a complete ban was no longer in the
public interest but that some restrictions were. See Prometheus I,
373 F.3d at 400–01. We agreed with this premise in Prometheus
I. Id. at 398–400. However, we concluded that the particular
proposal that the FCC adopted to replace the complete ban was
arbitrary and capricious. Id. at 402. The result was to leave the
1975 ban in place.
The Commission tried again during the 2006 cycle, but
we determined in Prometheus II that its new attempt did not
comply with the APA’s notice-and-comment requirements.
12

The national television ownership rule used to be included in
the review as well, but Congress has withdrawn it from the
purview of § 202(h). See Prometheus I, 373 F.3d at 389.
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Prometheus II, 652 F.3d at 445. Once again, our conclusion
resulted in the complete ban staying on the books. In the 2014
FNPRM & Order, the Commission struggled to find a way to
make the rule work, and it discussed the possibility of leaving
radio/newspaper combinations unregulated and limiting its
restrictions to television/newspaper cross-ownership. See 2014
FNPRM & Order ¶¶ 113–20.
As a result, the 1975 ban remains in effect to this day
even though the FCC determined more than a decade ago that it
is no longer in the public interest. This has come at significant
expense to parties that would be able, under some of the less
restrictive options being considered by the Commission, to
engage in profitable combinations. The delay also hampers
judicial review because there is no final agency action to
challenge. Cf. Core Communications, 531 F.3d at 856
(“Moreover, until the FCC states its explanation for its interim
rules in a final order, Core cannot mount a challenge to those
rules. In this way, the FCC insulates [itself] . . . from further
review.”).
B. Vacatur is not appropriate
Deregulatory Petitioners argue that the result of this delay
should be to vacate all five broadcast ownership rules that are
subject to § 202(h). This would wipe the slate clean. And, unless
the Commission were immediately to issue new rules, it would
lead to a degree of deregulation that is unprecedented in the
modern broadcast industry.
Despite asking for such sweeping relief, Deregulatory
Petitioners do not cite a single instance when a court has ordered
mass vacatur in similar circumstances. There is a reason for this:
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Vacatur typically is inappropriate where it is “conceivable” that
the Commission can, if given the opportunity, create a
supportable rule. See Allied-Signal, Inc. v. U.S. Nuclear
Regulatory Comm’n, 988 F.2d 146, 151 (D.C. Cir. 1993). Here,
despite the delay, we have no reason to suspect that the
Commission cannot justify at least some restrictions on
broadcast ownership.
We must also consider the “disruptive consequences of
vacating.” Id. In this case, vacatur risks creating a temporary
free-for-all in the broadcast industry, with companies racing to
engage in previously prohibited combinations before the FCC
comes forward with new regulations. This would invite chaos,
and it presumably would lead to drawn-out litigation over
whether combinations entered into during this vacuum could
continue to exist even if the Commission later determined to
outlaw them once again.
Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 280 F.3d 1027
(D.C. Cir.), opinion modified on reh’g, 293 F.3d 537 (D.C. Cir.
2002), which Deregulatory Petitioners cite as support for
vacatur, is not contrary to our conclusion. There the D.C. Circuit
said that if “the reviewing court lacked the power to require the
Commission to vacate a rule it had improperly retained [during a
Quadrennial Review] and could require the Commission only to
reconsider its decision, then the presumption in § 202(h) would
lose much of its bite.” Id. at 1048. This is a reference to the
notion that “Section 202(h) carries with it a presumption in
favor of repealing or modifying the ownership rules.” Id.
At the outset, we note that there is little left of this
presumption in light of subsequent clarifications from both the
D.C. Circuit and our Court. See Cellco P’ship v. FCC, 357 F.3d
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88, 97–99 (D.C. Cir. 2004); Prometheus I, 373 F.3d at 394–95.
Quibbling aside, we agree that vacatur is sometimes appropriate
in the § 202(h) context. It is most likely appropriate in the
setting the D.C. Circuit described in Fox—when the
Commission has reached a final (but unsupportable) decision to
retain, rather than repeal or modify, a rule. Here the Commission
has not reached any final determinations. Deregulatory
Petitioners are not complaining of improper agency action;
rather, their problem is with agency delay. When an agency
gives its reasoning for retaining a rule and a court concludes that
it is insufficient and incapable of being cured, vacatur makes
sense. With no final justifications to review, however, we cannot
be convinced that it would be futile to allow the Commission to
try to come to a supportable conclusion.
That is not to say that vacatur is never an appropriate
response when the allegation is agency delay rather than
arbitrary and capricious agency action. For instance, in Core
Communications the D.C. Circuit gave the Commission six
months to justify certain rules or have them wiped from the
books. Core Communications, 531 F.3d at 861. There, however,
the Court had twice remanded the issue to the Commission,
which had delayed action for six years after the second remand.
Id. at 850. That situation is analogous to the Commission’s
delays on the eligible entity definition. Here, by contrast, the
delay did not begin until after Prometheus II. Though its delay is
troubling, the Commission was not on notice that its tardiness
might result in vacatur.
C. Deregulatory Petitioners have waived other forms of relief
There is yet another reason why vacatur is inappropriate:
Deregulatory Petitioners could have sought relief in the form of
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an order under APA § 706(1) or a writ of mandamus. Under
either of these provisions, we could have ordered the
Commission to resolve promptly its 2010 and 2014 review
cycles. This route, rather than vacatur, typically is the
appropriate remedy to agency delay. See Cellco P’ship, 357 F.3d
at 101. However, unlike Citizen Petitioners, who specifically
sought APA § 706(1) and mandamus relief, Deregulatory
Petitioners abandoned those requests.
Of the petitions for review, the only one to take issue
with the delayed Quadrennial Review process was filed by the
National Association of Broadcasters (“NAB”). It charges the
Commission with “unlawfully withhold[ing]” action, but it
requests vacatur as the remedy and never gives any indication
(apart from a generic plea for any relief we deem appropriate)
that it seeks an order mandating action. See NAB Petition for
Review at 3, 5. Similarly, the sole remedy that Deregulatory
Petitioners request in their opening brief is vacatur. They cite
§ 706(1) in their reply brief, but only in a footnote in that
document do they even mention remedies other than complete
vacatur. Specifically, they suggest that, if “the Court does not
vacate the rules outright, it should at minimum vacate with a stay
to urge quick action or remand with direction to act
immediately.” Deregulatory Petitioners’ Reply Br. at 11 n.2
(internal citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
By focusing their energy on vacatur, Deregulatory
Petitioners went for a home run. Instead, they have struck out.
Now they find themselves with alternative requests that are not
singly, but rather doubly, waived: first because they were raised
for the first time in a reply brief, and second because they were
relegated to a footnote. See United States v. Pelullo, 399 F.3d
197, 222 (3d Cir. 2005) (“It is well settled that an appellant’s
failure to identify or argue an issue in his opening brief
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constitutes waiver of that issue on appeal.”); John Wyeth & Bro.
Ltd. v. CIGNA Int’l Corp., 119 F.3d 1070, 1076 n.6 (3d Cir.
1997) (“[A]rguments raised in passing (such as, in a footnote),
but not squarely argued, are considered waived.”). As a result,
we decline to order APA § 706(1) or mandamus relief.
Our conclusion that Deregulatory Petitioners have
litigated themselves out of relief, however, should not be
confused with a green light for further agency delay. At oral
argument, counsel for the Commission made the same assurance
here as he did in the context of the eligible entity definition: that
the Chairman intends to circulate an order to the other
Commissioners by June 30 of this year, with the expectation
being that it would be finalized and adopted by the end of the
year. See Oral Arg. Tr. at 46. The order, we are told, would
bring the 2010 and 2014 Quadrennial Reviews to a close. Id. at
41, 46.13 We fully anticipate that the Commission will meet this
deadline. However, if it fails to complete the reviews by then, it
does so at its own risk. New litigation would likely result, and
the outcome may well be different.

We note that, in addition to § 202(h)’s requirement to review
the rules to see if they are necessary in light of competition, the
Quadrennial Review must also, per our previous decisions,
include a determination about “the effect of [the] rules on
minority and female ownership.” Prometheus II, 652 F.3d at
471. In studying this, the Commission should consider how the
ongoing broadcast incentive auction affects minority and female
ownership.
13
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V. The Joint Sales Agreement Rule
The Commission places restrictions on common
ownership of broadcast television stations. For instance, the
local television ownership rule allows “one entity to own two
television stations [with overlapping contours] in a market (a
television duopoly) as long as at least one of the stations was not
ranked among the market’s four largest stations and at least
eight independently owned and operated stations (called ‘eight
voices’) would remain post-merger.” Prometheus II, 652 F.3d at
439. Imagine a market with ten overlapping stations: Stations
A–J (with Stations A–D being the four largest). Clearly, the
local television ownership rule prevents one company from
owning Stations D, E, and F because there is a limit of two.
But what if a company owns Stations D and E and has a
contract that gives it significant influence over station F? To
answer this question, the Commission has “attribution” rules. If
Station F is attributed to the owner of Stations D and E, it means
that the latter is considered to own the former for purposes of
the Commission’s ownership caps. The purpose of attribution
rules is to prevent companies from circumventing ownership
limits by doing through clever contracting what they are not
permitted to do through outright purchases of stations.
In 2014, the Commission created a new attribution rule
for television joint sales agreements (“JSAs”). A JSA is a
contract that allows one station (the brokering station) to sell
advertising (but not programming) on a second station (the
brokered station). Specifically, the FCC determined that samemarket JSAs involving the sale of more than 15 percent of the
brokered station’s weekly advertising will be attributed (i.e.,
counted toward ownership caps). See 2014 FNPRM & Order
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¶ 340. Returning to our example, if the owner of Stations D and
E has a JSA over the 15-percent threshold with Station F, that
arrangement would violate the Commission’s ownership rules.
Importantly, the new rule does not outlaw JSAs over the 15percent limit; it just means that they must be counted toward
ownership caps. For instance, a company that only owns one
television station can have an attributable JSA with a second
station without running afoul of the ownership limits (as long as
the eight-voices and the four-largest-stations rules are not
violated). Deregulatory Petitioners challenge the television JSA
rule and argue that its enactment violated § 202(h).
A. Background
The 2014 television JSA rule traces its roots to the 1990s,
when the FCC first attributed local marketing agreements
(“LMAs”). They are similar to JSAs, except that they involve
the sale of programming as well as advertising on the brokered
station. In 1992, the Commission attributed same-market radio
LMAs over the 15-percent threshold. Revision of Radio Rules
and Policies, Report and Order, 7 F.C.C.R. 2755, ¶ 65 (Mar. 12,
1992). Seven years later, it extended that rule to cover samemarket television LMAs and once again used 15 percent as the
limit. Review of the Commission’s Regulations Governing
Attribution of Broadcast and Cable/MDS Interests, Report and
Order, 14 F.C.C.R. 12559, ¶ 83 (Aug. 5, 1999).
The Commission moved on to same-market radio JSAs as
part of the 2002 § 202(h) review. 2002 Biennial Regulatory
Review—Review of the Commission’s Broadcast Ownership
Rules and Other Rules Adopted Pursuant to Section 202 of the
Telecommunications Act of 1996, Report and Order and Notice
of Proposed Rulemaking, 18 F.C.C.R. 13620, ¶ 317 (June 2,
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2003). We upheld the radio JSA attribution rule, which used the
same 15-perent threshold, in Prometheus I. We determined that
it was a “modification ‘in the public interest’ under § 202(h)”
because attribution “prevent[ed] [the] local radio rule from
being undermined.” Prometheus I, 373 F.3d at 429. We also
concluded that the rule was neither arbitrary nor capricious
because the FCC “sufficiently rationalize[d] its decision to
jettison its prior nonattribution policy and replace it with one
that more accurately reflects the conditions of local markets.” Id.
at 430.
In 2014, the Commission extended its rationale once
more, this time to capture same-market television JSAs over the
15-percent threshold. 2014 FNPRM & Order ¶ 340. It reasoned
that the purpose of its attribution rules is to “identify those
interests in licensees that confer on their holders a degree of
influence or control such that the holders have a realistic
potential to affect the programming decisions of licensees or
other core operating functions.” Id. ¶ 343 (internal quotation
marks omitted). Employing this test, it found that television
JSAs “have the potential to convey significant influence over a
station’s operations such that they should be attributable.” Id.
¶ 350.
Essentially, the Commission’s view is that JSAs over the
15-percent threshold look enough like ownership to count as
such. It wrote that
JSAs provide incentives for joint operation that
are similar to those created by common
ownership. For example, when two stations are
commonly owned, the paired stations may benefit
by winning advertising accounts that are new to
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both of them (rather than by having one co-owned
station win an account from the other) and,
possibly, by being able to raise advertising prices
above those that they would obtain if the stations
were independently owned. A broker selling
advertising time on two stations, one of which is
owned by the broker, has incentives similar to
those of an owner of two stations to coordinate
advertising activity between the two stations.
Id. ¶ 351.
The FCC said that its decision on television JSAs was
“informed by our experience with the attribution of radio JSAs,
which has operated to ensure that the goals of our radio
ownership rules are not undermined by nonattributable
agreements conferring the potential for significant influence
over a station’s core operating functions.” Id. ¶ 349. See also id.
¶ 350 (“Consistent with the Commission’s analysis supporting
attribution of radio JSAs . . ., we now find that television JSAs
involving a significant portion of the brokered station’s
advertising time convey the incentive and potential for the
broker to influence program selection and station operations.”).
The FCC acknowledged that its decision to attribute samemarket television JSAs was a break from its past practice, and it
described its previous nonattribution policy as “incorrect.” Id.
The Commission also dismissed as irrelevant comments
that the public interest benefits of JSAs outweigh the concerns
about undue influence: “We find . . . that those arguments bear
on the issue of liberalization of [ownership caps] and not on the
question of whether JSAs give the brokering station a degree of
influence and control that rises to the level of attribution, which
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is the sole focus of our inquiry here.” Id. ¶ 349. In other words,
the Commission’s view is that if anyone wants to complain
about the harm stemming from ownership restrictions, the
proper thing to attack is the caps themselves. But as long as it is
in the public interest to regulate ownership, the Commission
says it has flexibility to prevent end-runs around its rules by
regulating agreements that are the functional equivalent of
ownership control.
As for setting the threshold at 15 percent, the FCC
reasoned that it has “consistently applied [this number] to
determine whether to attribute JSAs in radio markets and LMAs
in both television and radio markets, and we find that it is
appropriate to use that same [number] here.” Id. ¶ 360. It further
explained that its rule
will allow a station to broker a small amount of
advertising time through a JSA with another
station in the same market without triggering
attribution, yet will fall short of providing the
broker a significant incentive or ability to exert
influence over the brokered station’s
programming or other core operating functions
because it will not be selling the advertising time
in a substantial portion of the station’s
programming.
Id.
Finally, the Commission declined to include a
grandfathering provision that would safeguard existing samemarket television JSAs over the 15-percent threshold. It found
that “such grandfathering would allow arbitrary and inconsistent
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changes to the level of permissible common ownership on a
market-by-market basis based not necessarily on where the
public interest lies, but rather on the current existence or
nonexistence of television JSAs in that market when the new
attribution rule becomes effective.” Id. ¶ 367. The Commission
gave entities with existing JSAs two years to come into
compliance with the new regulations, see id., but Congress has
extended the deadline to 2025, see Pub. L. No. 114-113, § 628,
129 Stat. 2242, 2469 (2015).
Of all the Commission’s ownership limits, the one most
affected by the new policy is the local television ownership
rule.14 In a dissent, Commissioner Pai faulted the Commission
for changing the television JSA rule without determining, as part
of a § 202(h) Quadrennial Review, that the local television
ownership caps remain in the public interest. His view was that
the Commission, before telling companies that they need to
reduce the number of stations they own if counting JSAs puts
them over the limit, needs to determine that it remains necessary
even to have a limit in the first instance.
He wrote that the “merits of our attribution rules can’t be
separated from the merits of our local television ownership
rules. If, as the Commission submits, it is taking action today to
‘prevent the circumvention of our ownership limits,’ then it
follows that we are obliged to take into consideration arguments
regarding the adequacy of those ownership limits.” Pai Dissent
14

Although most of the debate about television JSA attribution
has related to its effect on the local television ownership rule,
the Commission has said the attribution standard would also
apply to other rules that restrict television ownership. See 2014
FNPRM & Order ¶ 363 & n.1119.
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at 4596 (footnote omitted). He contrasted this with the 2002
review, where the Commission “affirmatively decided” to
maintain radio ownership limits (upon a finding that they were
in the public interest) before determining that radio JSAs are
attributable. Id. (“There was no attempt to dodge consideration
of uncomfortable or inconvenient facts. By contrast, today’s
item fails to decide whether our current local television
ownership rule remains in the public interest, reserving the issue
for another day—or more accurately, another year.”).
Commissioner O’Rielly echoed Commissioner Pai’s statements,
writing that “there is a distinct possibility that the record that
develops as a result of our 2014 Quadrennial Review could
require us to relax some of our TV ownership rules. That could
make this effort to unwind JSAs a complete waste of time and
money.” Statement of Commissioner Michael O’Rielly,
Dissenting, 29 F.C.C.R. 4371, 4604 (Mar. 31, 2014).
B. Discussion
In this context, Deregulatory Petitioners claim that the

2014 television JSA rule violates § 202(h) because it amends the
Commission’s ownership limits—in particular, the local
television ownership rule—without concluding that the
preexisting caps are in the public interest. Their argument is
that, even if the failure to complete the Quadrennial Review
does not lead to vacatur of all ownership limits, the Commission
cannot expand a rule without first justifying it in its current
form. The Commission responds that the television JSA rule is
not subject to § 202(h), which in its view is limited to a review
of where ownership levels are set (i.e., how many stations can be
commonly owned) and does not extend to decisions about
attribution (i.e., how much influence or control over a station
creates the equivalent of ownership).
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At the outset, we must decide whether this dispute is
properly before us. The Commission argues that Deregulatory
Petitioners waived this challenge per 47 U.S.C. § 405(a). Under
that provision, “a party seeking judicial review of an FCC
‘order, decision, report, or action’ must file a petition for
reconsideration if it ‘(1) was not a party to the proceedings
resulting in such order, decision, report, or action, or (2) relies
on questions of fact or law upon which the Commission . . . has
been afforded no opportunity to pass.’” Prometheus II, 652 F.3d
at 454 (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 405(a)). The Commission says that
Deregulatory Petitioners fail the second prong of this test
because they did not present the argument to the Commission,
either initially or in a petition for reconsideration, before
requesting judicial review.
We conclude that the challenge is not waived. The text of
§ 405(a) “does not refer to the necessity of a party raising an
argument before the Commission—as does the typical
exhaustion statute—but [instead] only [requires] that the
Commission have an ‘opportunity to pass’ on a question of fact
or law raised in the petition.” Time Warner Entm’t Co., L.P. v.
FCC, 144 F.3d 75, 79 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (emphasis in original).
Thus, where a dissent by a Commissioner raises “the very
argument” that the parties address to us, there is ordinarily no
bar to judicial review because it would be “ignoring the realities
of administrative decision-making to say that the [Commission]
majority had no opportunity” to pass on the issue. Office of
Communication of United Church of Christ v. FCC, 465 F.2d
519, 523 (D.C. Cir. 1972). In Prometheus II, without taking
issue with the premise that a Commissioner’s dissent can fairly
present an issue, we imposed some limitations. There two
Commissioners raised a particular issue that the parties did not,
but neither Commissioner devoted more than two sentences to it.
Under those circumstances, we concluded that § 405(a) barred
us from deciding that issue. Prometheus II, 652 F.3d at 454–55.
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We distinguished Office of Communication of United Church of
Christ because, unlike in that case, it was “far from clear
whether the full Commission considered” the dissents. Id. at
455.
Our situation is different. Commissioner Pai issued a
lengthy dissent that presented, in great detail, the argument that
the television JSA rule violates § 202(h). As discussed, he said
that the “merits of our attribution rules can’t be separated from
the merits of our local television ownership rules” and that the
Commission was “obliged to take into consideration” arguments
against the ownership caps before expanding attribution. Pai
Dissent at 4596. He ended with a call for “our nation’s
judiciary” to step in, which clearly signals that his rationale
could provide the basis for a legal challenge. Id. at 4602. This
sets us apart from the insufficient notice that the dissents
provided in Prometheus II.
Moreover, the Commission demonstrated an awareness
of a potential § 202(h) challenge. Indeed, it expressly contrasted
its ownership limits, which it conceded were subject to § 202(h),
with its attribution decisions. It said that for attribution the “sole
focus” is whether agreements “give the brokering station” a
sufficient amount of “influence and control,” and it disavowed
the need to make the type of public interest inquiry that is
required under § 202(h). 2014 FNPRM & Order ¶ 349. As a
result of this and Commissioner Pai’s dissent, the Commission
had notice of the argument, and nothing in § 405(a) bars us from
deciding it.
Turning to the merits, we agree with Deregulatory
Petitioners that the Commission violated § 202(h) by expanding
the reach of the ownership rules without first justifying their
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preexisting scope through a Quadrennial Review.15 In
Prometheus I we made clear that § 202(h) requires that “no
matter what the Commission decides to do to any particular
rule—retain, repeal, or modify (whether to make more or less
stringent)—it must do so in the public interest and support its
decision with a reasoned analysis.” Prometheus I, 373 F.3d at
395. Attribution of television JSAs modifies the Commission’s
ownership rules by making them more stringent. And, unless the
Commission determines that the preexisting ownership rules are
sound, it cannot logically demonstrate that an expansion is in the
public interest. Put differently, we cannot decide whether the
Commission’s rationale—the need to avoid circumvention of
ownership rules—makes sense without knowing whether those
rules are in the public interest. If they are not, then the public
interest might not be served by closing loopholes to rules that
should no longer exist.
To see how this problem plays out, we return to our
example from above, where an entity owns a duopoly (two
television stations with overlapping contours in a market) that is
permitted under the local television ownership rule. That entity
also has a JSA over the 15-percent threshold with a third
overlapping station in the same market. Prior to the 2014
FNPRM & Order, this arrangement would be compliant because
the JSA would not have been attributable. As a result of the
2014 FNPRM & Order, however, the entity would need to sell
one of the two stations it outright owns or unwind its JSA with
the third station because otherwise it would be considered to
own three stations in violation of the limit. It would need to do
15

Deregulatory Petitioners also argue that the JSA rule is
arbitrary and capricious. Because we conclude that it violates
§ 202(h), we do not need to reach this or any other challenge to
the rule.
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so even though the FCC has not determined since the 2006
Quadrennial Review that it is even in the public interest to limit
the number of stations that can be under common control in the
same market.
The Commission’s response—that its attribution
decisions are separate from its ownership rules and are not
subject to § 202(h)—does not persuade us. First, it is foreclosed
by Prometheus I. There we called the radio JSA rule a
“modification to the local radio ownership rule” and only upheld
it after determining that it complied with § 202(h). Id. at 429–
30. Second, even if we were not bound by Prometheus I, the
Commission’s proposed distinction is artificial. Attribution rules
do not exist separately from the ownership rules to which they
relate. If there were no ownership caps, there would be no need
to have attribution rules. The purpose of the latter is to delimit
the scope of the former. Because attribution is so entwined with
ownership caps, it would make little sense to say that one is
subject to § 202(h) but the other is not.16
16

It is true that there is at least one other instance following the
adoption of § 202(h) where the Commission has altered its
attribution rules without finishing a full review cycle.
Specifically, the 1999 attribution of television LMAs came
shortly before the completion of the 1998 § 202(h) review.
However, the history of that attribution decision sets it apart
from the current one. When Congress enacted § 202(h), the
Commission had already undertaken efforts to revise the local
television ownership rule. The Commission therefore decided to
forge ahead with the changes outside (and ahead) of its § 202(h)
proceedings. On the same day it enacted the television LMA
attribution rule, it issued a separate order modifying the local
television ownership rule and concluding that the rule, as
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In light of this, we hold that the Commission cannot
expand its attribution policies for an ownership rule to which
§ 202(h) applies unless it has, within the previous four years,
fulfilled its obligation to review that rule and determine whether
it is in the public interest.17 Here the Commission put the cart

amended, served the public interest. See Review of the
Commission’s Regulations Governing Television Broadcasting,
Report and Order, 14 F.C.C.R. 12903, ¶ 59 (Aug. 5, 1999). It
later determined that this procedure, though conducted outside
of the formal § 202(h) context, satisfied the provision’s
requirements. See 1998 Biennial Regulatory Review—Review of
Commission’s Broadcast Ownership Rules, Biennial Review
Report, 15 F.C.C.R. 11058, ¶ 3 (May 26, 2000). As a result, the
Commission only attributed television LMAs after making what
it considered to be a § 202(h)-compliant finding that regulating
television ownership continued to be in the public interest. We
also note that no party sought judicial review of the 1999
attribution decision on the theory that it violated § 202(h), so no
court had the opportunity to determine whether the procedure
was valid.
17

We note the possibility that a reviewing court may ultimately
disagree with the Commission’s public interest determination on
an ownership rule. This is not necessarily fatal to the ability to
enact an attribution rule. For instance, in Prometheus I we
concluded that the Commission had failed to justify the specific
numerical limits on how many radio stations a company could
control under the local radio ownership rule. Prometheus I, 373
F.3d at 432–34. We nonetheless permitted the Commission to
enact the radio JSA rule. The difference is that it had
determined—and we had agreed—that limiting common
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before the horse. It adopted the JSA rule even though its
Quadrennial Review cycle was severely backlogged. Because
the rule’s enactment was procedurally invalid, we vacate it and
remand the matter to the Commission. Cf. Prometheus II, 652
F.3d at 453 (vacating and remanding rule that did not comply
with notice-and-comment requirements).
On remand, if the Commission is able to justify (by
finding they are in the public interest) the existing ownership
rules to which television JSA attribution applies—or, in the
alternative, if it replaces the current rules with new ones it
determines to be in the public interest—nothing in our opinion
would prevent it from readopting the JSA rule at that time. The
rule, if readopted, might be challenged on grounds that extend
beyond what we decide today, and we offer no opinion on the
merits of any such attacks. We merely note that our decision to
vacate is unrelated to the question of whether television JSAs
should be attributable interests and rests instead on the
Commission’s failure to comply with § 202(h).18
ownership of radio stations was in the public interest. Id. at 431–
32. Its only failure was its lack of sufficient explanation for the
precise limit on common ownership. Here, by contrast, we are
not dealing with a Quadrennial Review that is merely flawed,
but rather with one that has never been completed. Before
defining ownership more restrictively, as it does when it enacts
an attribution rule, the Commission must at a bare minimum
show that it is even in the public interest to regulate ownership
in the first instance.
18

JSAs and LMAs are part of a broader universe of sharing
agreements that the Commission has called “shared service
agreements” (“SSAs”). In the 2014 FNPRM & Order, the
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VI. Conclusion
In sum, we conclude that the Commission has delayed
too long on the eligible entity definition, and we remand and
order mediation; we decline to vacate the whole universe of
broadcast ownership rules that are subject to § 202(h), but we
remind the Commission of its obligation to complete its

Commission sought comment on whether to require disclosure
of other types of SSAs. See 2014 FNPRM & Order ¶ 320.
Petitioners have attacked this decision from both sides.
Citizen Petitioners say that the Commission acted
arbitrarily and capriciously by not attributing all remaining SSAs
at the same time it attributed television JSAs. The Commission
responds that it needs to study the broader SSA universe more
closely before making an attribution decision. In light of this,
Citizen Petitioners’ claim fails. See Williamson v. Lee Optical of
Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 489 (1955) (“[T]he reform may take
one step at a time, addressing itself to the phase of the problem
which seems most acute to the legislative mind.”); Nat’l Ass’n of
Broadcasters v. FCC, 740 F.2d 1190, 1207 (D.C. Cir. 1984)
(“[A]gencies, while entitled to less deference than Congress,
nonetheless need not deal in one fell swoop with the entire
breadth of a novel development . . . .”).
Deregulatory Petitioners, by contrast, argue that the
decision to single out JSAs was arbitrary and capricious because
the Commission conceded that it did not have enough
information to attribute the whole SSA universe. We need not
decide this, as we are vacating the JSA rule on another basis.
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Quadrennial Review responsibilities; and we vacate the
television JSA rule and remand the matter to the Commission.
This is our third go-round with the Commission’s
broadcast ownership rules and diversity initiatives. Rarely does a
trilogy benefit from a sequel. To that end, we are hopeful that
our decision here brings this saga to its conclusion. However,
we are also mindful of the likelihood of further litigation. As a
result, this panel retains jurisdiction over the remanded issues.
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SCIRICA, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in
part.
I join in my colleagues’ comprehensive analysis and
disposition of the eligible entity definition and the television
joint sales agreement rule. With regard to the Commission’s
inaction on the broadcast ownership rules, however, I
respectfully dissent. I would neither dismiss the petitions nor
would I vacate the broadcast ownership rules. But I would
compel the Commission to take final action.
The Commission has declined to issue a final order
that decides whether the five broadcast ownership rules
continue to be “necessary in the public interest as the result of
competition,” as required by Section 202(h) of the
Telecommunications Act of 1996. By opting to “merge” the
2010 Quadrennial Review into the 2014 Quadrennial Review
rather than complete it, the Commission has evaded its
congressional mandate under Section 202(h) and this Court’s
directives in Prometheus II. The Quadrennial Review process
has foundered and, like a sailboat, needs to right itself and get
back on course.
The Commission has a duty to complete its now longoverdue 2010 Quadrennial Review, both under Section
202(h) and under our remand order in Prometheus II. Section
706(1) of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C.
§706(1), permits us to “compel agency action unlawfully
withheld or unreasonably delayed” in circumstances where
(as here) the agency is compelled to take a specific action.
See Norton v. S. Utah Wilderness All., 542 U.S. 55, 62-63
(2004). This Court also has authority to issue a writ of
mandamus to prevent the frustration of its own previously-
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issued orders. See In re: Chambers Dev. Co., Inc., 148 F.3d
214, 224 (3d Cir. 1998); see also In re Core Commc’ns, 531
F.3d 849, 856 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
It has been more than eight years since the public and
the industry have had the benefit of a current assessment of
the broadcast ownership rules. As my colleagues aptly
observe, the Commission’s delay has had significant
consequences. While the industry changes and evolves and
new technologies emerge, broadcasters are required to adhere
to a set of ownership rules, at least one of which is now four
decades old, without the benefit of a fresh assessment of
whether “such rules are necessary in the public interest as the
result of competition.” Perhaps they are and perhaps they are
not; that decision is not for this Court to make in the first
instance. But the Commission must make some decision,
either to retain, repeal, or modify those rules.
As my colleagues recognize, the Deregulatory
Petitioners chose to pursue a bold form of relief, asking this
Court to strike down all of the broadcast ownership rules
entirely. But an advocate’s arguable overreach is not a basis
for declining to act. Given the egregious delay in the face of
a congressional directive and a mandate from this Court, a
disagreement with the Petitioners about the proper form of
relief should not bar us from taking action.
The Commission Chair has stated that he intends to
circulate a draft final order by the end of June. But a draft
proposal by one Commissioner is no guarantee that a final
order is forthcoming. At oral argument, the Commission
would not agree to any firm deadline for action, noting, “It’s a
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multimember body. It’s hard to bind them.” There should be
a firm timeline for action.
In In re Core Communications, the Court of Appeals
for the D.C. Circuit considered a similar case of egregious
Commission delay under a different provision of the
Telecommunications Act of 1996. The Court determined that
the unreasonably delayed agency action under APA § 706(1)
and the agency’s violation of the Court’s prior mandates
warranted judicial intervention. It therefore granted a writ of
mandamus and directed the Commission to respond – in the
form of a final, appealable decision – within a strict timeline
for action. See 531 F.3d at 862.
I would follow that approach here. Under APA
§706(1) and in furtherance of our mandate in Prometheus II, I
would issue a writ of mandamus and remand this matter to the
Commission with the instruction that it must adopt and issue
a final decision completing the 2010 Quadrennial Review of
the broadcast ownership rules within six months. I would
direct that this Court retain jurisdiction to ensure compliance
with this deadline.
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